Norway in the High North: Burden-sharing in practice

Norway – its land and sea – lies between Russia and the North Atlantic. Norway’s strategic situation means that Norway and North America share a common destiny. Prime Minister Jonas Gahr Støre has said that Norway is closely tied to the protection of the US homeland.

Norway has a common land border with Russia, a long coastline and has the responsibility for extensive maritime areas. Russia’s Northern Fleet, strategic submarines and much of Russia’s nuclear arsenal are located on the Kola Peninsula, about 100 kilometres across the border from Norway. It is the same Russia that has created the most serious security policy situation since World War II, is trying to wipe Ukraine off the map, is ignoring international law and is appearing increasingly authoritarian. This impacts the security situation in the North.

Russian strategic systems are not primarily directed towards Norway or other Scandinavian countries – but directed primarily towards the United States and the wider Euro-Atlantic region. The strategic situation of Norway is therefore uniquely important in an Arctic- and NATO-allied perspective.

Geography, however, can be understood both as an asset and a risk. Norway’s approach to an increased focus on security needs in the North is to strengthen our national defence capabilities in a way that contributes to bilateral cooperation as well as the common strength of NATO defence. As Norway commits forces, infrastructure, resilience and political resolve, our strategic position is an allied advantage. As such, strengthening Norway’s defence is not an exclusively national project. It is an investment in the security of the entire Euro-Atlantic area.

Norway’s defence policy aims at being an integral part of a unified and allied response capacity, to demonstrate will and ability to be part of a more equitable burden-sharing in NATO – and thus also to be able to influence allied policies in the North. A fair national contribution to our shared security is also an insurance policy for Norway’s own security.

What the North requires

Collective defence, as enshrined in the North Atlantic Treaty Article 5, remains a continuous commitment and a cornerstone of Norwegian security. However, the willingness and ability of each ally to protect its territory, maintain necessary forces and assist the others – as described in the treaty’s Article 3 – is also key.

Norway is often described by others as NATO’s eyes and ears in the North. Situational awareness, combining the input from surveillance capacities as well as the ability to analyse and understand developments of importance in our geographic surroundings, is key. We also need to continue to exercise authority in our territory and waters, protect critical infrastructure, respond to incidents and support allied operations.

Monitoring Russian submarine activity is a particularly important Norwegian contribution. It strengthens situational awareness in the High North and the North Atlantic, areas of critical importance given Norway’s proximity to Russia’s nuclear submarine capabilities. Submarines, maritime patrol aircraft, frigates, satellites and other sensors each provide essential parts of the picture.

The requirements are considerable. Norway needs ships capable of maintaining a presence at sea, submarines able to operate covertly, aircraft and sensors that can monitor extensive areas, air defence, trained forces, ammunition and protected communications.

Norway’s Long-term Defence Plan for 2025 to 2036 provides the foundation for this effort. When presented in April 2024, the plan proposed NOK 600 billion in additional defence expenditure over twelve years and a total defence framework of NOK 1,624 billion. It was intended to almost double the defence budget in real terms by 2036 and strengthen our capacity in all three domains, land, air and sea. As of 2026, Norway spends 3.4% of assessed GDP on core defence – including military support for Ukraine, reaching NOK 70 billion in 2026. Norway is delivering on its commitments from the Hague Summit and will reach the 5% (3.5% core defence plus 1.5% towards broader security and resilience) target by 2035 at the latest.

The maritime investments are especially relevant to security in the North. The Norwegian Parliament has approved the procurement of new frigates with anti-submarine warfare capabilities as well as new submarines. Contracts were signed for the procurement of five frigates with British producers, and with Germany for the procurement of six submarines. Our long-term defence plan also includes long-range surveillance drones, satellites, additional air defence, larger land forces, stronger logistical stocks and improved capacity to receive allied reinforcements.

Burden-sharing is about capability, not accounting

Norway’s defence choices must also be understood in a wider European context. Europe needs to spend more on defence not merely because the United States has requested it, but because Europe’s own security requires greater military and industrial capacity.

But percentages do not deter. Capabilities do.

The decisive questions are whether European countries can field trained formations, protect their airspace and maritime approaches, replenish ammunition, move reinforcements, maintain equipment and sustain operations. More spending must result in greater readiness, larger stockpiles, robust infrastructure, increased industrial production and forces that can operate together.

Norway’s security depends on European allies possessing forces that can deploy to and operate in the North. At the same time, a more capable European contribution strengthens the transatlantic relationship. It provides the United States with European allies that can carry more of the conventional burden and contribute more effectively to common defence.

Common procurement can help turn spending into capability. Larger and more predictable orders can support production, reduce unnecessary fragmentation and create shared logistics and training structures. The objective is not uniformity for its own sake, but greater combined military effectiveness.

Norway’s submarine and frigate partnerships show what this can mean in practice. The visible product is a ship or submarine, with joint maintenance, compatible systems, shared training, common upgrades and the ability to operate together from the beginning of a crisis. The wider result is more efficient defence, through better coordination and more trust.

Procurements and partnerships: implementing the burden shift

Procurement of key capabilities should not be seen as independent of further strategic thinking. Norway is, comparatively, not a very big country. The number of assets – be that aircraft, frigates or submarines – that we can muster, may not be overly impressive on their own. But assets should not be seen in isolation from total allied input, or total allied needs. Neither will the manpower of the Norwegian air, land or naval forces alone be comparatively impressive. Capacities, operations and plans shall be seen in light of our allied commitments and potential. In short, this is about what NATO Secretary General Mark Rutte calls NATO 3.0 – a stronger Europe in a stronger NATO. As Europe takes on greater responsibility for our security, delivering on the military capability targets is more important than ever. And procurement and partnerships become mutually reinforcing.

Allied bilateral or plurilateral partnerships do not compete with NATO. They make NATO more operational by connecting collective commitments to particular forces, equipment, training arrangements, industrial programmes and reinforcement plans.

Enhanced partnerships between Norway and close Allies are key to delivering on this burden shift, by overlapping layers of national, allied and bilateral capacity. NATO provides the collective defence, and our bilateral agreement with the US is a cornerstone of our defence. Bilateral arrangements with European allies add speed, depth and practical integration.

The submarine partnership with Germany and Canada demonstrates this approach. Norway and Germany are developing and acquiring Type 212CD submarines as a common programme. Initial contracts were signed in 2021, and production subsequently began with plans for common life-cycle management of the vessels, as well as maintenance and upgrades.

In July 2026, Canada decided to join the German-Norwegian programme.

The partnership links three allies with responsibilities in European and North American waters through a common platform of hardware, software and people. It creates a foundation for common training, logistics, maintenance, technological development and operating concepts across the North Atlantic.

Norway’s frigate partnership with the United Kingdom follows the same logic. In August 2025, Norway selected the United Kingdom as its strategic partner for acquiring new frigates. The Norwegian government presented the arrangement not simply as a purchase, but as a long-term partnership for procuring, developing and operating the vessels.

The framework agreement signed in September 2025 stated that the Norwegian and British Type 26 frigates should be as identical as possible and have the same technical specifications. It envisaged cooperation on operations, crew training, maintenance, technology and further development. The Norwegian minister of defence said the two countries, through this programme, in practice would have an integrated frigate fleet.

The wider Lunna House Agreement further connects maritime cooperation with rapid reinforcement, joint activity and a greater British military presence in Norway.

This illustrates how procurement can anchor allied involvement. Shared equipment creates continuous relationships among armed forces, industries and governments. It encourages common training, shared planning and mutual reliance. It cannot predetermine every future political decision, but it can make cooperation more familiar, practical and immediate.

Common procurement and common knowledge of military realities, can therefore become alliance policy in material form. When allies operate identical or closely compatible equipment, cooperation does not have to overcome differences designed into their platforms. Interoperability is built into the capability from the beginning.

From bilateral to regional

During the NATO Defence Ministers’ meeting in Brussels in June 2026, the two bilateral partnerships were complemented by the signing of an agreement in which Germany, the United Kingdom and Norway assume greater responsibility for monitoring and following submarine activity in the North Atlantic and the High North. The goal is to strengthen NATO’s anti-submarine warfare capability, take greater responsibility for responding to Russian submarine activity in the North Atlantic, and reduce pressure on US global capabilities.

Then, at the NATO summit in Ankara, eleven European countries, including Iceland, and Canada, announced a decision to cooperate more closely on security in the North Atlantic, the Arctic and the Baltic Sea.

The initiative to establish a broad maritime partnership was proposed by Norway, the goal being to make a significant contribution to enhancing security in the North Atlantic and High North. This initiative was also a direct response to calls by the US for other countries to assume more responsibility for the security of Allied territory – as commented by Prime Minister Jonas Gahr Støre at the time of signing.

Without a shared commitment to substantive capability build-up, it is much harder to envisage that partnerships of such depth would materialise. It is also hard to envisage that each country – also Norway – would gain the insight needed to participate actively and over time in decision-making in the realm of defence in the North Atlantic and the High North.

All of the above initiatives find their place within the framework of NATO. Norway cannot defend its extensive territory and maritime areas alone. The Alliance connects Norwegian capabilities to the forces, plans and strategic resources of thirty-one other allies.

But Norway’s role cannot be that of a passive recipient of security. Norwegian surveillance, land-, air- and maritime forces, infrastructure and ability to receive reinforcements all contribute to the defence of the Alliance. The Norwegian government’s February 2026 acquisition plan explicitly states that Norway must strengthen its independent ability to safeguard national and allied freedom of action, assume greater responsibility for national and regional security and improve burden-sharing.

National defence and allied involvement are interdependent. Allied forces require functioning ports, airfields, storage facilities, communications and transport networks. They also need Norwegian units with which they have trained and can operate. A strong host nation makes reinforcement faster, safer and – not least – militarily credible.

Finland’s and Sweden’s accession to NATO has created new possibilities for integrated Nordic planning. All five Nordic countries are now allies, and seven of the eight Arctic states belong to NATO. The Norwegian and Finnish prime ministers have emphasised that allied engagement in the Arctic is legitimate, longstanding and defensive.

Regional, Nordic cooperation also becomes more important – Sweden and Finland’s entry into NATO has made Nordic defence cooperation politically as well as operationally key to improved defence in the High North. Nordic Air Power Concept (NAPC) is one case in point.

Together, Finland, Sweden, Norway and Denmark operate more than 200 advanced combat and fighter aircraft, including F-35s and Saab Gripens.

After Sweden and Finland decided to join NATO, substantive work has been done to facilitate shared operational planning, integrated command and control, and flexible base deployments – to be able to operate as closely to one force as possible.

The cooperation is aligned into NATO structures, through the Combined Air Operations Centre in Bodø, Norway. This cooperation enhances the total air defence power of the Nordic countries.

Norway’s proximity to the Kola Peninsula and its knowledge of Russia’s northern forces remain distinctive contributions to NATO. The North Atlantic, Norwegian Sea and Barents Sea also retain their particular maritime importance.

Norwegian effort brings NATO into the region, while NATO multiplies the effect of Norwegian effort.

Strength to preserve stability

Norway’s policy in the North has traditionally combined military strength with predictability. That balance remains essential. Deterrence is not provocation. Credible defence reduces the risk that another state will misjudge Norway’s ability or willingness to respond.

Norway should continue necessary practical cooperation with Russia – which safeguards biological resources important to all. At the same time, it must make clear that covert activity against critical infrastructure, and other forms of potential sabotage, is unacceptable. There is demonstrated value in surveillance and allied coordination, to prevent hostile activities and demonstrate Norwegian and allied forces’ ability to act – and act together.

Norway and its allies must possess the knowledge and capabilities required to distinguish accident from coercion, and normal activity from preparation for sabotage.

That requires surveillance above, on and below the sea; protected communications; resilient civilian infrastructure; effective intelligence cooperation; and political procedures capable of responding when attribution is difficult. Above all, it requires partnerships that have been developed and exercised before a crisis occurs.

Norway’s strategic position carries special responsibilities. Its defence investments help protect maritime communications, critical infrastructure and the northern approaches to the Atlantic.

The objective is to preserve peace, political freedom and stability in a region that has long depended on restraint and predictable conduct. It is to ensure that no potential adversary concludes that distance, secrecy or allied hesitation can be exploited.

Norway’s will and capacity to carry its own share of our common defence burden goes hand in hand with expectations of sustained allied defence involvement. By strengthening its own defence, reinforcing NATO and developing lasting partnerships with allies, Norway aims to contribute to a stronger Europe, a more balanced transatlantic relationship and a credible Alliance.